Artificial Intelligence in Humans by Laufer, Michael Swan
ar
X
iv
:1
31
1.
07
16
v1
  [
cs
.A
I] 
 30
 O
ct 
20
13
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN HUMANS
DR. MICHAEL SWAN LAUFER PH.D.
1. Introduction
In the early days of artificial intelligence, Alan Turing put forward a test in hopes of
answering the question as to whether machines can think.1 It continues to this day to be
the benchmark test for artificial intelligences; now called the Turing test. The test consists
of running a series of conversational exchanges over a text channel between a human tester
and other humans, as well as the AI in question. If the human tester cannot reliably
identify which of the conversations are the AI, the AI has passed the Turing test.
Fifty years later, Edward Feigenbaum, put forward a variation of this test, in which a
sophisticated, specialized AI can be tested against a team of specialists in the particular
area in which the AI has been trained.2
In Feigenbaum’s paper, he describes the Turing test as follows:
In the test, a human judgement must be made concerning whether a set of
observed behaviors is sufficiently similar to human behaviors that the same
word—intelligent—can justifiably be used. The judgement is about behaviors
not mechanism. Computers are not like human brains, but if they perform
the same acts and one performer (the human) is labeled intelligent, then
the other must be labeled intelligent also.
The interesting result which this reasoning sires is: since this judgement is about behaviors
and not mechanisms, the only thing which truly separates a human from a machine is the
mechanism by which we think. The important point here being that the machine imitates
behaviour without “understanding” what is occurring.
This issue has long been a hot point of debate in the philosophy of AI. The “strong AI”
theory asserts that an AI is capable of having a mind, as well as mental states; versus the
“weak AI” position, which suggests that a machine is only capable of behaving intelligently.
Strangely, there is a parallel in the world of pedagogy, which seems to remain unexplored.
When we work to create curricula and motivate methods of instruction, far too often there
is a focus on behavior, rather than the mechanisms within a student which motivate their
behavior.
However, students, teachers, and schools are all measured based primarily on stan-
dardized test scores.4 This is understandable, because, ideally, it allows for an unbiased,
1
2 DR. MICHAEL SWAN LAUFER PH.D.
quantifiable, scale with which one can compare achievement of teachers and ability of stu-
dents. The shortcoming, however, is that as soon as these tests are made the measure of
worth, then everyone involved shifts their focus from mastering the material upon which
the test is based, to mastering the test itself. This objection has been well-explored5,6,7 .
If this were the only issue, solutions could be crafted in order to fix this; but there is a
deeper problem here. All too often students are learning an abstract set of behaviors which
imitate understanding of the material. Additionally, teachers are training this very thing
actively, because it is a safe strategy. Attempts to foster understanding may or may not
yield results; training however always does (provided students are sufficiently hardworking,
obedient, and have suitable medium-term memories.) Furthermore, in some instances, the
teachers themselves lack understanding of the material, but are merely adept at training
these imitative behaviours.
If we teach students to mimic behaviours in order to make them perform well on assess-
ments, we rob them of their humanity. Worse than that: we waste it. We reduce people
to a state of nonthinking, in which they have to work extremely hard to stick to protocols
which may be extremely complex, and we do not provide any means to understand the
ideas upon which those protocols are based.
Feigenbaum goes on to say:
For ... a computational intelligence, to be able to behave with high levels of
perfomance on complex intellectual tasks, ... it must have extensive knowl-
edge of the domain.
This is essentially code for what every struggling teacher already knows: if your students
do not understand the concepts you are trying to teach them, you must get them to
memorize a tremendous amount of information in order to compensate. This is the root
of the tendency for to approach to all subjects to become content-based.
2. Continuation
When he goes on to define “Subject Matter Expert Turing Test”, which we now call
the Feigenbaum Test, he asks if a human judge can determine, at better than chance level,
which entity is his colleague, and which is the computer, after asking deep probing questions
about a specific area of specialized expertise. If one replaces the computer in this scenario
with a human impostor, we are faced with the situation which I put forward in my paper
A Misanthropic Interpretation of the Chinese Room Problem.8 If a person has merely
been trained to give responses to queries on a particular topic the way an expert would, it
might be quite difficult to determine that the person was not, in fact, a genuine expert. If
we extend this idea to pedagogy, the question arises as to whether or not a human judge
(much less an exam) can differentiate between a student who has a genuine understanding
of the material, and one who merely has filled their memory with so many work-around
mechanisms that they can imitate the behaviour of a student who is understanding.
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The obvious answer is no. Or at least, not without great difficulty. If we were to
implement assessments to differentiate between these two, I fear we would be extremely
disappointed, and would find that the number of students who are actually understanding,
rather than imitating well is negligible.
We are essentially programming people as though they were high powered AI computers,
or what Feigenbaum terms expert systems; a programmed protocol for obtaining outcomes
based on inputs in an efficient and predictable manner. We then declare ourselves success-
ful, when we give them what is essentially a simplified Feigenbaum test, and those whom
we have trained perform well. This is almost tautological. We are merely training people
to perform well on exams. The instances when someone performs well on an exam because
they posses an understanding of the material, is almost a fluke.
We cheat all students this way. The ones who do not wish to learn, we reward when they
bypass the learning process with exam mechanisms. To the ones who genuinely understand
the material, we do not give sufficient credit, because their performance on exams does not
differ from those who merely use test taking strategies and memory. Worst of all, those
students who are struggling to understand the material, and have a genuine interest will
oftentimes fall back to strategies of exam performance because of the pressure caused by
evaluation based on examination. Rare indeed it is when a student would sacrifice their
grades for the possibility of understanding.
As tragic as all of this is, it is entirely understandable. Both sides of the interchange
have the best of intentions: the students want to perform well, and the teachers want to
have a large quotient of well-performing students. Furthermore, the technique of training
a student for an exam is a stable, robust solution, and so it is attractive. It has consistent
and medium to fair results in the aforementioned measured outcomes.
3. Why this is important.
We need to shift our focus from evaluating the bahaviours of students to evaluating the
mechanisms by which they produce their outcomes. If one takes this idea to a slightly less
abstract level, one can imagine asking a person with no understanding of arithmetic to learn
how to perform two-digit multiplication; they leave and come back after some time, and
give the correct answers to every given question every time. This may seem satisfactory.
However, if we then ask this person how they are performing the task, and they say merely
that they memorized all 10,000 possible outcomes of two digit multiplication, you would
be very disappointed that they didn’t really learn what you were trying to convey. I ask,
though: when a student is taught a procedure for two-digit multiplication, for which the
basis in the distributive property is not explained, is this really much better, save for
the fact that there is less tax on their memory? Don’t get me wrong: mechanisms and
shortcuts are useful for making the mechanics of many things faster and easier. However if
mechanisms are not grounded in concept, we are merely programming artificial intelligence
modules into human brains. The human brain is capable of so much more, and it is truly
a crime that we use such a powerful and elegant tool in such a crude way.
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I wish to stress that this is not an epistemological question in the way some of these
questions can be when they are posed in the AI setting; we are dealing with real human
beings, who can explain their thinking, and their methods of arriving at their answers.
Of course, were we dealing with a theoretical savant who had a perfect-recall memory,
and spent years reading a dozen books a day on a given topic, and was able to merely
recall the appropriate passage from some text each time they were prompted in casual
conversation, it would be difficult, and perhaps take quite a long time before they finally
tripped up, and said something that alerted you to their underlying ignorance. However
in most cases, if we were set out with the intention of determining whether someone had
genuine understanding of a topic or not, it undoubtedly would not take long at all to
uncover their level of mastery, merely by going conceptually deeper with each question.
4. Solutions
In order to fix this problem we must work hard to base any content on concept in the
process of conveying it. In the course of examination, in addition to asking a student to
complete a task, we have to ask in an abstract narrative form for the student to explain
why they took the approach they did, and why it works. This solution is far from popular,
because it involves a tremendous amount of work. However if we are genuinely trying to
help students learn, and not merely trying to perpetuate a tradition of faith in what was
said by those who came before, we have an obligation to put in any amount of work which
is required in order to help.
5. Conclusions
Unless we stop treating our students like machines, and start addressing the mechanisms
of their thought processes, we may as well stop teaching altogether, and apply all our efforts
to developing AI systems, which will run in just as sterile a manner, but faster, and with
greater reliability.
We must focus on those things which set us apart from machines, and develop those
actively, or else we would do better to work on replacing ourselves with machines entirely,
and bring an end to the era of humans to a close.
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